NORMS IN A NATURAL WORLD

Schedule & Abstracts
November 21 - November 23, 2019
SCHEDULE
THURSDAY 21.11.

12:00 PM – 12:55 PM  Registration

12:55 PM – 1:00 PM  Jaroslav Peregrin / University of Hradec Králové
Opening, including introducing the first keynote speaker

1:00 PM – 2:15 PM  Keynote: John Michael / University of Warwick
The sense of commitment in joint action

2:15 PM – 2:30 PM  Coffee Break

Chair  Mark Risjord / Emory University, University of Hradec Králové

2:30 PM – 3:20 PM  Jaroslav Peregrin / University of Hradec Králové,
Normative mindshaping and the normative niche

3:20 PM – 4:10 PM  Ladislav Koreň / University of Hradec Králové
Norms all the way down?

4:10 PM – 4:25 PM  Coffee Break

4:25 PM – 5:15 PM  Casey Doyle / University of Hradec Králové
Widespread error and first-person authority

5:15 PM – 6:05 PM  Vladimir Svoboda / Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic
Rules, norms and our concepts

FRIDAY 22.11.

Chair  Ladislav Koreň / University of Hradec Králové

10:00 AM – 11:15 AM  Keynote: Philippe Rochat / Emory University
Self-Conscious roots of human normativity

11:15 AM – 12:05 PM  Mark Risjord / Emory University, University of Hradec Králové
Normative statuses and joint action: A Minimalist Account for Inferentialists

12:05 PM  Lunch Break

Chair  Jaroslav Peregrin / University of Hradec Králové

2:05 PM – 2:55 PM  Marco Brigaglia / University of Palermo
Normative control from reasons to causes

2:55 PM – 3:45 PM  Tomáš Hříbek / Institute of philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

3:45 PM – 4:00 PM  Coffee Break
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<th>Time</th>
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| 4:00 PM - 4:50 PM | **Oliver Schütze** / University of Giessen  
Normativity as an evolved form of our practices |
| 7:00 PM  | **Conference dinner/banquet**  
(restaurant Jachta) |
| **SATURDAY 23.11.** | **NORMS IN A NATURAL WORLD** |
| **Chair**   | **Martin Paleček** / University of Hradec Králové  |
| 9:15 AM - 10:30 AM | **Keynote: Marco Schmidt** / University of Bremen  
On the Ontogeny of Normativity |
| 10:30 AM - 11:20 AM | **Simon Fitzpatrick** / John Carroll University  
Nonhuman normativity: problems and prospects |
| 11:20 AM - 11:35 AM | **Coffee Break** |
| **Chair**   | **Casey Doyle** / University of Hradec Králové  |
| 11:35 AM - 12:25 PM | **Filip Tvrdý & Petra Chudárková** / Palacký University Olomouc  
Cognitive and moral laziness |
| 12:25 PM - 1:15 PM | **Vilius Dranseika** / Vilnius University  
Immorality and Bu Daode, Unculturedness and Bu Wenming |
| 1:15 PM   | **Closing of conference. Lunch** |
On the Ontogeny of Normativity

Dr. Marco F. H. Schmidt
University of Bremen, LMU Munich

The capacity for normativity – our understanding of right and wrong – lies at the core of uniquely human forms of structuring and understanding socio-cultural group life. Over the last couple of years, there has been an increasing interest across disciplines in the ontogeny of normativity. In this talk, I will first present our theoretical framework for investigating children’s and infants’ developing understanding of normative phenomena. I will then report developmental research within this framework that focuses on young children’s appreciation and learning of norms in social interactions. Our findings suggest that even young children develop normative attitudes toward others’ conduct in a variety of different contexts. Thus, they criticize and protest violations of practical norms in rational and context-dependent ways. And young children seem to quickly make normative inferences based on sparse evidence: They spontaneously infer the presence of a social norm from watching a single action in a context devoid of clear (e.g., linguistic or pedagogical) cues indicating normativity. Finally, children’s understanding of normative phenomena is not confined to practical norms, but extends to issues of epistemic normativity: Preschoolers understand something about the social-normative status of knowledge, namely, that we are entitled to claim knowledge about some state of affairs if we have sufficient reason to do so.

Together, these findings suggest that normativity is an integral part of human social cognition from early in ontogeny. Hence, young children not only attempt to explain and predict others’ actions in causal-descriptive terms – rather, they are eager to learn about the ways “we” do things and even to (co-)construct and actively defend our shared normative reality.

THURSDAY 21.11.
1:00 PM
The Sense of Commitment in Joint Action

Dr. John Michael
University of Warwick

I will provide an overview of recent research investigating various factors which modulate the sense of commitment in joint action – both in adults and in children, as well as in the context of human-robot interaction. I will also distinguish among distinct hypotheses concerning the mechanisms underpinning the sense of commitment, and discuss ongoing research aiming to tease these hypotheses apart experimentally.

FRIDAY 22.11.
9:15 AM

Self-Conscious Roots of Human Normativity

Philippe Rochat
Emory University

What are the roots of human normativity and when do children begin to behave according to standards and norms? Empirical observations demonstrate that we are born with built-in (implicit and automatic) orientation toward what is predictable and of the same - henceforth what deviates from it -, what is “normal” in the generic sense of the word. However, what develops in humans is self-consciousness making human normativity profoundly different from any other forms expressed by other animals, including “smart” machines. Self-consciousness is construed as the ability to objec-tify oneself through the evaluative eyes of others. It sets us apart as a species and is at the roots of human normativity. A developmental blueprint capturing the progres-sive co-emergence of self-con-sciousness and normativity in the human child is proposed.

FRIDAY 22.11.
4:10 PM
Members entering a community are inevitably formed by its “cultural framework” (via the process of enculturation). The “cultural framework”, in turn, is produced by the members of the community. The nature of this dialectical movement—producing the framework while being produced by it—has long been investigated; however, it is only recently that some scholars have started to appreciate the centrality of rules and norms for an adequate description of this phenomenon. In this paper I argue that to understand it we must give pride of place to norms at a radically foundational level—we must realize how deeply normative we as humans are. I argue that even the most promising accounts of this movement, such as those based on the concept of “mindshaping” or on the idea of “social niche construction” must be seen as essentially normative enterprises.
Norms all the way down?

Ladislav Koreň
University of Hradec Králové

Norms are often said to embody standards of correct or appropriate behaviour shared and enacted by a community of individuals. Much research has recently focused on the so-called "norm psychology": a set of psychological mechanisms that dispose human beings to establish, identify, acquire (including internalizing) and enforce standards set by norms. It has been suggested that humans evolved to be "set up to be set off" by social-normative patterns, though such cognitive or motivational predispositions or biases surely require social-cultural environment and nurturing to be activated and cultivated. But do social-normative practices shape human minds themselves? If yes, to what extent and how? This question has been asked somewhat less often. An ambitious recent attempt to fill this lacuna – which combines insights from both philosophy and psychology - has been elaborated by Henrike Moll and Andrea Kern (Moll 2017, Kern and Moll 2017). According to them, we humans are unique animals in that the ways in which we cope with the social and non-social world – in experience, thought, reasoning or problem solving – constitutively depend on "shared understanding" of what we are doing that involves standards of correct performance. This shared understanding is said to infuse all sorts of our capacities and activities, including those classified as belonging to individualistic understanding. Kern and Moll talk about its "transformative" impact on human mind. They contrast this view with "additive" accounts, according to which skills of shared understanding (tailor-made to cope with social domains) merely expand the more basic repertoire of individualistic understanding (cognition, problem solving), which remains by and large unaffected. The line of reasoning leading to these conclusions is
mostly philosophical. But it is taken to be reinforced by empirical evidence indicating that even the ways in which we acquire and exercise our intentional capacities for coping with non-social - psychological or causal - domains are socially scaffolded and mediated by our unique social-cognitive skills. In my contribution I aim to show that the proposed marriage of philosophical and empirical considerations leaves something to desire. I will first reconstruct those two lines of reasoning. Next I will argue that the first line of reasoning is in certain respects too vague to warrant bold philosophical conclusions entertained by Kern and Moll. Whilst the empirical line warrants much more modest claims about the relation between individualistic and shared (social) understanding.

Widespread Error and First-Person Authority

Casey Doyle
University of Hradec Králové

It is widely held that knowledge of one's own beliefs and other attitudes possesses a number of distinctive features including epistemic privilege, first-person authority, and a uniquely first-person method. An increasingly influential sceptical challenge holds that results from empirical psychology reveal that there is nothing distinctive about self-knowledge. I'll look at the evidence supporting the claim that we are subject to widespread error when we form beliefs about our own minds and consider which account of first-person authority is compatible with it. I'll suggest that at least one, which draws on the idea that the mental is normative, is. Reflection on normativity helps to provide a naturalistic-friendly account of first-person authority.
Rules, norms and our concepts

Vladimír Svoboda
Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

In the first part of my presentation, I will try to distinguish various interpretations of the thesis that normativity can be understood in naturalistic terms. I will then argue that the decision as concerns correctness of the thesis depends - if we focus on interpretations that are interesting - to a large extent on the preferred delineation of the meanings of its pivotal terms. In the second part, I will expose the ambiguity of the terms “rule” and “norm” and propose a specific convention regarding their use in naturalistically oriented philosophical discussion. I will also suggest that the introduction of the concept of rudimentary normative situations can be useful for clarification of our debates on normativity.

THURSDAY 21.11.
5:15 PM

Normative Statuses and Joint Action: A Minimalist Account for Inferentialists

Mark Risjord
Emory University and the University of Hradec Králové

One of the more profound chicken-and-egg questions that emerges from reflecting on human evolution concerns the relationship of individual action and social action. Human forms of cooperation are apparently quite out of reach of our nearest cousins, depending as they do on capacities for planning, altruism, normative response, and so on. On the other hand, cooperative social environments scaffold human intentionality, making it possible for us to have the very capacities that make further cooperation possible. Broadly, there are two responses to this conundrum. Some theorists have proposed that human evolution proceeded through a unique evolutionary event, probably related to our capacity for language. This evolutionary jump made human intentionality possible. It in turn enabled more sophisticated forms of joint action, and ultimately gave rise to the kinds of social interaction we observe in human prehistory. The alternative proposal is that social interaction makes human levels of intentionality possible. Precursors of modern humans developed capacities for joint action before they had full human intentionality. The evolutionary conundrum
reflects divergent philosophical approaches to language and thought. Intentionalists—a group that would include Husserl and Searle—hold that the individual human capacity to think about something is fundamental to our ability to speak about something. On this view, the human capacity for mental representation must be prior to the capacity for expressing representations in words. Externalists, by contrast, take any individual capacity of representation to be derivative from social interaction. Twentieth century externalists include Wittgenstein and Heidegger (on some readings). More recently, Brandom’s normative inferentialism has articulated a detailed account of the social structures necessary to support individual representational states like belief. Whatever the attractions of externalism, the intentionalists seem to have a knock-down argument against it. Externalist accounts appeal to social interaction, and even the simplest forms of human sociality require joint intentionality. All of the current theories of social ontology postulate sophisticated representational capacities: mutual knowledge, we-intentions, joint commitment, and so on. There is simply no way that sufficiently sophisticated practices could arise without the prior existence of human-like intentionality. Social accounts of representation are simply non-starters. This essay will use Brandom’s normative inferentialist account of language and thought to make concrete the lacuna that gives the foregoing argument its force. The elementary building blocks of Brandom’s account are the normative social statuses of entitlement and commitment. Since an agent cannot undertake a commitment or possess an entitlement alone, prima facie, such statuses depend on joint actions. This essay will begin by analyzing the presuppositions of these normative statuses to determine whether they require joint action, and if so, what the character of that joint action might be. It will then sketch the elements of a minimalist account of joint action—that is, an account that does not presuppose full-blown representational capacities—and try to determine whether Brandom’s normative inferentialism could rest on a minimalist foundation.
The general assumption shared by most naturalistically-oriented conceptions of normativity is that normative phenomena are nothing but clusters of neuro-psychological structures and processes, which can be entirely analysed in causal, non-normative terms. Normative judgment – broadly understood as the discrimination of a given item, and in particular of a given action, as “correct” or “incorrect” – is taken to be a peculiar neuropsychological state which, under certain conditions, has causal efficacy over behaviour. Normative standards – criteria of correctness, such as norms or reasons – are taken to be peculiar neuro-psychological structures, which have causal efficacy over judgments. The normative guidance provided by norms, reasons, judgments, is taken to be a peculiar neuropsychological causal process. The main task that a naturalized account of normativity should accomplish is to convert this assumption in a full-developed theory which specifies, in a sufficiently detailed and empirically testable way, to what kind of neuro-psychological structures and processes normative phenomena amount to, and what precisely are the relevant differences between normative guidance and other types of decision-making processes. One of the most radical objections commonly raised against this project is the alleged irreducibility of normative phenomena to causal processes. Roughly, the objection runs as follows. Our normative judgments, it is argued, are not mere neuro-psychological states capable of causally influence our actions. They are liable to be justified, correct, and only therefore capable to justify, make correct, our actions. The same holds for reasons. They are not mere neuro-psychological structures capable of causally influencing our judgments. They are liable to be justified, correct, and therefore capable to justify, make correct, the appropriate judgment. Given any neuro-psychological and causally efficient state J my judgment is supposed to be reducible to, I can sensibly wonder whether J was correct, justified. Given any neuro-psychological structure P which supposedly caused in the relevant way my judgment J, I can sensibly wonder whether it is correct to adopt P as a guide (whether P truly is a reason), and whether it is correct to draw J on the basis of P. Correctness escapes neuro-psychological and causal reduction. These claims have strong phenomenological appeal.
They seemingly capture some core features of the subjective experience of normative guidance: the sense of being “freely guided”, and not driven, by standards which are, in some sense, open-endedly detachable from our own psychological, contingent make-up. In spite of the weird metaphysic it seems to imply, this objection, I think, deserves to be taken seriously.

The feature of normativity it points out is a real one, and a satisfactory naturalized account of normativity should be able to explain it. Given this premise, I submit a sketchy account of normativity in terms of a peculiar form of (cognitive) control, and I argue that this account can intelligibly hold together two apparently contradictory points: that normativity is reducible to a cluster of neuropsychological causal processes, and that normativity open-endedly escapes causal reduction. According to my proposal, normative judgment should be understood as a hierarchically structured neuro-psychological state. At the first layer is what I call simply “judgment”, that is, the outcome of a controlled – relatively slow and attention demanding – decision-making process. Roughly, automatic actions are inhibited; alternative options are searched for and evaluated on the basis of certain parameters (e.g., a certain goal), simulating their execution and anticipating their outcomes; the option which better satisfies the parameters involved is selected. The second layer is the meta-cognitive confirmation of the first-level judgment by a second-level control process. Human minds are capable of recursively activate higher-level control processes, whose targets are lower-level control processes. We can hold in memory a given judgment, and submit it to control by repeating the process. We can build meta-representations of how control processes should develop (e.g., rules of inference) and use them as parameters to control whether a given control process fits them. We can question the parameters we used, and submit them to control on the basis of further parameters. Recursive control may assume a very complex structure, but I surmise that the basic operation to which it amounts to is, for most human brains, a trivial skill – the same skill exhibited by a child who opposes a “why” to every “because”, and realizes that he could go on open-endedly. I submit that normative judgment is the state in which we are when the selection of a given action is confirmed by a higher-level control process. In this case, the action counts as “correct”. The same holds for normative standards: they are those control parameters whose adoption is confirmed by a higher-level control process. They are, that is, correct parameters. This sketched framework should be improved with further details in order to capture normativity’s manifold dimensions: intuitive, quasi-automatic forms of normative judgment;
implicit normative standards; the social nature of normativity; the link between normativity and the self; the interplay between normative control processes and automatic and emotional processes; the differences between different kinds of normativity (prudential, moral, legal, aesthetical, linguistic, etc.). It is, however, sufficient for my purpose, that is, to account for the fact that normativity, even if it is reducible to a cluster of neuro-psychological causal processes, open-endedly escapes causal reduction. Control processes, including higher-level ones, are entirely analysable in neurophysiological, causal terms. The “normative” dimension is, therefore, reducible to appropriate causal roles. A normative judgment is a judgment confirmed by a higher-order control process. A normative standard is a parameter which causally determine, in the appropriate way, a judgment, and is confirmed by a higher-order control process. But control can be recursively reactivated until the limits of our cognitive capabilities, and so, for any judgment and for any parameter which count as normative, that is, which have the relevant causal role, we can question whether they are really correct, that is, we can submit them, again, to a higher-level control process. In this perspective, the peculiar phenomenology of normative guidance, the feeling of being “freely guided”, and not driven, is inextricably linked to the sense of agency associated to control. This sense of agency is recursively reactivated whenever we question whether our judgment and the underlying parameters were really correct, that is, whenever we recursively reanimate higher-level control processes.
Intentionality, Normativity and Liberal Naturalism

Tomáš Hříbek
Institute of philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

In recent literature, “Liberal Naturalism” has been offered as a label for a middle-ground position between the Scylla of Scientific Naturalism, on the one hand, and the Charybdis of Supernaturalism, on the other. When it comes to the debate concerning intentionality and norms, it has been suggested that the Liberal Naturalists are able to see the norms that underlie intentional states as part of a broader concept of nature. A number of prominent philosophers have been labeled “Liberal Naturalists,” or have adopted the moniker themselves. In this paper, I shall inquire whether Tyler Burge, with his conception of psychology and intentional explanation, qualifies as a Liberal Naturalist.

FRIDAY 22.11.
2:15 PM

Intentionality, Normativity and Liberal Naturalism

Oliver Schütze
University of Giessen

Teleosemantics has become one of the received naturalistic views of semantics, yet only a few attempts have applied its framework to normative terms. This talk will address this gap by interpreting such an application and describing the implications of it about normativity in general. The general picture that emerges from this analysis is that »normativity« refers to a certain evolved form of our (inner and public) practices, and specific normative expressions refer to and emphasize certain aspects of this form. In the light of a teleosemantic perspective I understand normative practices as concrete entities with historically established features and a threat of extinction hanging over them – that is to say, I understand them in terms of their reproduction and their survival value. As a starting point, I consider a specific but perhaps quite paradigmatic normative linguistic practice: utterances of the form »You ought to φ« which are uttered by a speaker and directed at a specific hearer. A look at our ordinary practice will suggest – though the argument will not depend on – that at least sometimes such utterances have the following function:
(F) Ought-utterances have the (imperative) function of causing the addressee to realise the satisfaction conditions of the utterance.

Obviously (F) does not capture the specific features of such utterances because all utterances with an imperative form – all directives such as orders and requests – share this function. So, how do we capture the more specific features of ought-utterances within the scope of a functionalist theory? Following the insights of speech-act-theory, we can say the difference lies in their felicity conditions or background conditions. The point of all directives is to get the hearer to comply, so they both have an imperative function, but in the case of requests, the speaker believes the hearer is already motivated to further the speaker’s interest, whereas in the case of orders, the speaker has some kind of power over the hearer (to apply positive or negative sanctions). In a teleosemantic framework, we can understand those background conditions as normal conditions or success-conditions. Such conditions help to explain or are part of an explanation of how a function of an entity was historically fulfilled in the successful cases. That is, cases that fulfilled the function and therefore led to the proliferation of the entity under discussion. This proposal as to distinguish different types of speech acts in a teleosemantic framework quite naturally leads to an idea of how to determine the distinctive features of ought-utterances:

(S) The distinctive features of ought-utterances are not revealed by the function of such utterances, but rather by considering the specific way in which its function is (normally) fulfilled, that is, by their success-conditions.

The practice of using such ought utterances, as with other directives, can only be explained if there are successful performances of their use in the past. The fulfillment of the function of the utterance requires hearers to be able to comply. But, again, this success-condition is hardly specific to ought-utterances. In contrast to non-normative imperatives, I will argue that ought-utterances involve an implicit claim to justification – that it is right or justified to cause the addressee to fulfil the satisfaction condition. If this claim to justification is connected to the linguistic device or practice itself, then it must be part of its success-condition: it must contribute to an (causal) explanation of how the function of ought-utterances was fulfilled in the (historically) successful cases. But then the fact the ought-utterance was justified must have made a difference with regard to the fulfillment of its function and thus a causal difference in the reaction of the addressee – at least in a sufficient number of cases. Other-
wise, the dimension of justification or rightness could have played no role in the proliferation of the practice. Hence, for the aspect of correctness to be relevant to the practice (to have influence on the addressee), the addressee must have been able and in a position to react differentially to this aspect. In the talk I will go into the details of what this amounts to. The more general point of my talk is that the distinctive success-conditions of ought-utterances are to be found in the specific ways their function was fulfilled in the historically successful cases. I will systematically develop a set of success-conditions by which ought-utterances are distinguished. Normative practices in general, so I claim, can be defined as practices that have these conditions as success-conditions, and these conditions define the form of practices we refer to by the term »normativity«. It is important to notice that these success-conditions are to be causally efficacious conditions because they must contribute to a causal explanation of how the function of ought-utterances was fulfilled in the (historically) successful cases and therefore why this practice proliferated. In this sense these success-conditions determine the natural and essential form our normative practices. To establish this claim, I want to suggest programmatically how to generalise from the distinctive features of the specific practice of ought-utterances to a general account of normativity, an account that is rooted in natural and mundane conditions and that sheds some light on the genesis of our abilities to partake in normative practices.

FRIDAY 22.11
3:05 PM
Why should moral objectivity be threatened by evolutionary explanations of morality?

Susana Cadilha
NOVA University Lisbon

The fact that human beings are products of evolution had profound implications for our conception of morality. Maybe we are equipped with some kind of moral sense that is not rationally determined; maybe after all we are not moral creatures only because we are rational creatures: evolutionary explanations of morality aim at showing that we’re naturally designed to engage in some moral behaviors, naturally empathic with some situations and prone to detect certain moral features. But what does it really mean to say that our moral beliefs have an evolutionary basis? Consider a moral judgment: Slavery is morally wrong. Here are two ways of looking at it:

i) A descriptive or empirical view: why do people tend to make some (universal) moral judgments?

ii) A normative or philosophical perspective: what reasons are there to believe that slavery is morally wrong? What justifies such a belief? What should I think, and do?

In what concerns the descriptive view, there are some questions worth asking. We may want to know how human beings came to acquire and develop the capacity to make such judgments. (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008a; Machery and Mallon 2010). Here are some possible answers: the capacity to make moral judgments is an evolutionary adaptation shaped by natural selection, due to the fitness advantages that such a capacity bestowed our ancestors. For instance, being cooperative, or not being a cheater, was a naturally selected trait (Street 2006). Another possibility: the capacity to make moral judgments is a by-product of other capacities, such as a general capacity for language and thought, that was rather shaped by cultural constraints. From a philosophical point of view, we certainly want to know if the evolutionary forces merely shaped a general capacity for making moral judgments, or if they shaped the content of particular moral judgments. For instance, are we all prone to make judgments that condemn incest and ingroup aggression or cheating? But even if that is the case, what are its philosophical implications? In what concerns the normative perspective, there are also some questions worth asking: for
instance, what makes something a good reason for thinking that some action is morally wrong or morally right? What does it mean to say that something is morally wrong/right? Are we assigning a special kind of property, a moral property—such as wrongness or goodness—to actions as well as people's character? Are there objective moral truths (truths that do not depend, for their being true, on our subjective attitudes)? Given this way of looking to the situation, one of the problems here at stake is the following: do the questions in the scientific or empirical domain have some bearing for questions in the philosophical or normative domain? Which could be the possible connections and tensions? For instance, if it can be true that evolutionary forces shape the content of some particular moral judgments (condemning cheating or aggression), does it follow that we should think of those moral judgments as objectively true, possibly because we are designed with some capacity to track moral truth? Or should we rather think that we evaluate some actions as being morally good or bad due to the way we were naturally designed—and in that case moral judgments are not objectively true, for we would think differently if we had been a product of different natural histories? The clash between a scientific and a philosophical approach can be found at that point: there is a causal explanation for our holding of some of our moral views (for instance, there is an evolutionary causal history that shaped human psychology). But when we, as moral agents, for instance, say that slavery is wrong, we are not merely stating something that occurs in us, a biological process like that of being hungry; rather, we are defending some proposition (assuming there are such things as moral propositions) for which it is at least possible to provide something in the way of reasons (or rational evidence), something which is at least plausibly seen as justifiable, over and above its being a content of our thoughts having a causal explanation (why do I believe that slavery is wrong is a true proposition?) The problem is that, from a scientific point of view, this rational justification can be no more than a post hoc rationalization—the philosophical story according to which we have some moral beliefs because we grasp moral reasons is superfluous, if we can show the causal story behind our evaluative behavior, if it is possible to provide a natural explanation of why we value the things we do. The so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments claim that if we had had a different natural background, we might have a completely different tradition of moral thought, and if that is the case, then moral judgments can't be considered as objectively true (as moral realism presupposes). Evolutionary pro-
cesses would not have given us our capacity for moral judgment in order to help us in accurately tracking moral truths as such (Joyce 2006; Street 2006) because what matters in the moral/practical domain is what we happen to do, not that we actually track moral truths. What afforded our ancestors some reproductive advantage was not the fact that they were able to discover objective moral truths or ascertaining moral facts. It was utterly irrelevant whether what they believe is true or false, or whether there are indeed moral facts. Evolution had no need to provide us with a reliable capacity to form moral beliefs, a procedure for tracking moral truths. And if we can explain moral beliefs without positing such things as moral truths or moral facts, then moral realism (a metaethical thesis) is not true. I think this could be an argument against moral realism – but an argument which lies entirely within the domain of moral philosophy. An evolutionary story concerning the processes that gave us a capacity for moral judgment won’t tell us whether there are objective moral facts. Analogously, being able to track truths about highly abstract mathematical propositions or to formulate laws of physics had no significant reproductive advantage either, but from that it does not follow that there are no such truths or such laws. I think the empirical approach to ethics does indeed teach us something – namely it gives us a naturalized view of the agent capable of perceiving value. But there seem to be no reasons to think that from a naturalized perspective of the agent capable of perceiving value it must follow the naturalization of value itself. Explaining why we value the things we do is not the same as explaining why the things we value are worth valuing.
There has been increasing interest, on the part of philosophers and cognitive scientists, in the evolution of human capacities for normative reasoning—in particular, the ability of human beings to construct, learn, apply, and enforce social norms: normative standards of behaviour within social groups. The evolution of this basic form of normative psychology has been thought important for understanding the development of the psychological processes underlying moral reasoning and other types of normative discourse. Despite much disagreement on other fronts, there has been general agreement in this literature that such basic normative psychology is uniquely human and marks a significant discontinuity between Homo sapiens and our closest ape relativities and other nonhuman animals. Indeed, a number of scholars have taken it as their point of departure to try to explain what distinctively human cognitive processes could underlie this supposedly species-unique capacity, and what evolutionary events must have occurred only in the human lineage to give rise to such psychological discontinuity. But, why (aside from unreflective anthropocentrism) have researchers so confidently assumed the uniqueness of human normativity, and been so unmoved by the arguments of those who have pointed to evidence of social norms in chimpanzees and other nonhuman animals? In this paper, I review and critique some of the underlying motivations for pessimism about nonhuman normativity that have been articulated in the literature. These include the claim that language is necessary for the existence of social norms in a group, the claim that skills and motivations for joint and collective intentionality are cognitive prerequisites for the creation of social norms, and that normative evaluation requires a particularly sophisticated form of self-consciousness. I argue that these views tend to over-intellectualize human normative psychology and underestimate the extent to which a basic sense of normativity may exist in creatures without such advanced cognitive capacity. I also challenge the empirical basis for the claim that chimpanzees and other likely nonhuman candidates for normative capacity lack key indicators of genuine social norms, such as impartial third-party punishment. The overall message of the paper is that researchers are on extremely shaky ground in assuming the uniqueness of human
normativity. Although the current empirical evidence for social norms and normative reasoning in nonhuman animals is more suggestive than conclusive, we have only begun to explore the complex social arrangements of apes and other social animals, and only a handful of existing experimental studies have even tried to address the question of nonhuman normativity directly. The recent history of comparative psychology, which has seen claims of human uniqueness routinely undermined by advances in the study of nonhuman behaviour, gives us every reason to expect that the more we look and the better our experimental paradigms we will find that humans are not unique in thinking about the world in normative terms.

Cognitive and moral laziness
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Dual-process theories of reasoning have been widely used to explain people's poor decision choices. In general, dual-process accounts hold that System 1 unconsciously produces fast, automatic, yet unreflected solutions. System 2, on the other hand, allows us to reflect on the intuitive judgments of System 1 and to correct or override them when needed (Stanovich 1999). For example, individuals often perform poorly in Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick 2005) because they rely on intuitive System 1 without further reflection. In cognitive sciences, the tendency to rely on intuitive solutions rather than on slower and deliberate processes of System 2 has been described as "cognitive laziness". Mercier and Sperber (2011) proposed a revised version of dual-process account and claimed that the main function of human reasoning is argumentative. According to them, arguments are the output of intuitive inference, i.e. of System 1, whereas System 2 usually serves not for correction but rather for rationalization of intuitive beliefs. To eliminate mistakes in reasoning, wider argumentative context is required. Unfortunately, individuals seem to be more critical to other people's arguments than to their own and due to the confirmation
bias they tend to overlook the evidence which is not in compliance with their opinions (Trouche et al. 2015). The aim of our paper is to show that human brain uses the same strategies when dealing with moral problems, and that it is therefore possible to talk about “moral laziness”. Human cognition has not fully adjusted to complex moral situations we have to face in modern world. Most of the moral problems are too abstract for us, and therefore require higher cognitive load. Moreover, one of the specific features of moral intuitive beliefs is that they are usually accompanied by strong emotions which make them persuasive but also prone to manipulation. We suppose that moral disagreement among ordinary people often stems from moral laziness, i.e. their unconscious unwillingness to discuss different points of view without prejudice and to search relevant information. The phenomenon of moral laziness has serious consequences not only for descriptive moral philosophy, but also for normative ethics.

**Immorality and Bu Daode, Unculturedness and Bu Wenming**

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In contemporary Western moral philosophy literature that discusses the Chinese ethical tradition, it is a commonplace practice to use the Chinese term daode 道德 as a technical translation of the English term moral. The present study provides some empirical evidence showing a discrepancy between the terms moral and daode. There is a much more pronounced difference between prototypically immoral and prototypically uncultured behaviors in English (USA) than between prototypically bu daode 不道德 and prototypically bu wenming 不文明 behaviors in Mandarin Chinese (Mainland China). If the Western concept of immorality is defined in opposition to things that are matters of etiquette or conventional norms and thus tied to a more or less tangible moral/conventional distinction, then we are dealing with a different structure in Mandarin Chinese—the prototypically bu daode and bu wenming behaviors seem to largely overlap. We also discuss whether bu lunli 不倫理 and bu hefa 不合法 can be considered adequate candidates for translation of immorality and we answer in the negative.